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1. Introduction 
 
 An influential position in the philosophy of biology claims that 
there are no biological laws, since any apparently biological 
generalization is either too accidental, fact-like or contingent to be 
named a law, or is simply reducible to physical laws that regulate 
electrical and chemical interactions taking place between merely 
physical systems.2
In the following I will stress a neglected aspect of the debate that 
emerges directly from the growing importance of mathematical 
  
                                                 
1     Thanks to the editor D. Dennis for some helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 See for one John Beatty, “The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis”, in Gereon 
Wolters and John Lennox (Eds.), Concepts, Theories and Rationality in the 
Biological Sciences, Pittsburgh University Press, 1995, pp. 45-81. 
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models of biological phenomena. My main aim is to defend, as well 
as reinforce, the view that there are indeed laws  also in biology, and 
that their difference in stability, contingency or resilience with 
respect to physical laws is one of degrees, and not of kind.3
In order to reach this goal, in the next sections I will advance the 
following two arguments in favor of the existence of biological laws, 
both of which are meant to stress the similarity between physical and 
biological laws.  
 
1) In physics we find an important distinction between laws of 
succession (holding between timelike-related or temporally 
successive events/facts) and laws of coexistence (holding between 
spacelike-related, coexisting events).4
                                                 
3 For a previous defense of this thesis, see Sandra Mitchell, Unsimple truths: 
Science, Complexity, and Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. I 
hope to add new arguments so as to strengthen her view. For the idea of 
degrees of lawhood, see Marc Lange, “Laws, Counterfactuals and Degrees of 
Lawhood”, in: Philosophy of Science, 1999, pp. 243-267. 
 Examples of laws of 
coexistence are the Boyle-Charles law, relating pressure P and 
volume of gases V to their temperature T (PV=kT), Ohm’s law, 
relating resistance R to voltage V and intensity of current A (V/A=R), 
or the relation between the length and the period of a pendulum – 
T=2π(L/g)1/2. While all of these laws relate events or properties that 
4 See Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, 
in: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15, No. 2. 1948, pp. 135-175, who contrast 
causal laws (of succession) with laws of coexistence. The difference between 
causal laws and laws of coexistence had been originally proposed by John S. 
Mill. 
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are in some sense simultaneously existing, laws of succession 
instead describe the unfolding of physics systems in time. 
Against the possibility of biological laws, it is typically argued 
that biological laws of  evolution law are either non-existent or just 
too complicated to be formulated.5 For the sake of the argument, let 
us suppose that this thesis is true.6
2) Those who claim that there are no biological laws typically 
argue that lawlike-looking regularities in biology are either merely 
mathematical (and therefore a priori) or purely physical. In the 
former case, they are devoid of empirical content, in the latter they 
are empirical but not biological. The former claim has been put 
forward in particular by Brandom and Sober, and recently defended 
also by Okasha, by discussing examples like Price’s equation, 
formulas in population genetics like Fisher’s, or the simple Hardy-
 It then follows that if we could 
prove that (i) in biology, unlike physics, there are also no laws of 
coexistence, or that (ii) such laws, if existent, are really all physical, 
we would have concluded against the existence of biological laws 
tout court. In section 2, I will counter (i) and (ii) by discussing some 
examples of genuine biological laws of coexistence that I will refer 
to as structural biological laws. 
                                                 
5     By biological laws of succession I don’t mean laws of law, but simply laws 
regulating the evolution of biological phenomena in time. 
6 I don't think it is true, by the way, but I want to concede to the enemy of 
biological laws all the ground she needs. 
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Weinberg’s law in genetics (2006).7 Even though Sober (1997) does 
not think that this is an argument against the existence of laws in 
biology,8
Before discussing these two arguments in some more detail, 
however, it is important to clarify two methodological points raised 
by the issue I have been presenting so far. i) The first point is: when 
should we regard a regularity/law as biological or physical? In order 
to answer this first question, let me simply stipulate that a 
regularity/law can be regarded as biological (or physical) if it is 
formulated  in the language of current biology (or physics). As long 
as a law contains notions or concepts that are regarded as belonging 
 it clearly could be used in this way. What I will do in 
section 3 is to counter this claim by citing some mathematical 
models that seem to be applicable to various biological entities, from 
cells to flocks of birds, and that are certainly neither tautologies nor 
interpretable just with entities or data models referring to the 
ontology of current physics.  
                                                 
7 By referring to Price's equation, Okasha writes: “though the equation is little 
more than a mathematical tautology...”, Samir Okasha, Evolution and the 
levels of selection, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 3. Sober explains 
the Hardy-Weinberg’s law with the properties of coin tossing. And then he 
adds “if we use the term mathematical tautology sufficiently loosely, then 
many of the generalizations in biology are tautologies” in Elliott Sober, 
Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 72. 
8 In Elliott Sober, “Two outbreaks of lawlessness in Recent Philosophy of 
Biology”, in: Philosophy of Science, 64, 1997, S459, we read: “Fisher's 
theorem of natural selection says that the rate of increase in fitness in a 
population at a time equals the additive genetic variance in fitness at that time. 
When appropriately spelled out, it turns out to be a mathematical truth”. And 
yet, he argues, a law need not be empirical but could also hold a priori. 
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to current biology, we should consider it as biological, even if the 
notion in question were reducible to physics.9
I will therefore completely ignore appeals to wholly vague and 
undefined future and complete physics or biology. After all, “in the 
long run”, as Keynes would say, “we will all be dead”, and what 
matters to us is to try to solve our problems relatively to our current 
state of knowledge. 
  
ii) The second point is the criterion of demarcation to be used to 
draw a distinction between genuine laws and merely accidental 
generalizations. Here I will appeal to counterfactuals, intentionally 
ignoring the difficulties raised by this criterion.10
                                                 
9 Here I assume that reducibility does not entail elimination; and the case of 
thermodynamics is a clear exemplification of this claim: the reducibility of 
thermal physics to statistical mechanics does not entail that the properties that 
are typical of the former together with its laws disappear or are eliminated. 
 After all, such 
difficulties apply to physics as well as to biology, and it is not clear 
at all why the defenders of the existence of biological laws should 
solve them. Simply put, the main idea to be presupposed in the 
following is that while empirical generalizations do not hold 
counterfactuals, laws do. To repeat an oft-quoted example by 
Reichenbach, a generalization like “all gold cubes are smaller than 
one cubic kilometer”, if true, is true accidentally, since the 
counterfactual “if x were a gold cube, it would be smaller than one 
10      One of these is the smell of circularity raised by the criterion: one analyzes 
the notion of lawhood with counterfactuals but in order to know whether a 
counterfactual is true, one must already know which laws hold. 
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cubic kilometer” does not hold, since no law prevents gold cubes 
from being larger that one cubic kilometer. On the contrary, given 
the laws of radioactive decay, “if x were a uranium cube, it would be 
smaller than one cubic kilometer” is true.  
 
2. Laws of coexistence in biology 
 
The reader will recall that in the previous section I posed the 
following two questions: (1) do we have laws of coexistence in 
biology? If so, (2) are they reducible to physical laws? I will now try 
to answer them in turn. 
(1) An important but often neglected source of biological laws 
might concern exactly laws of the “form”, or of the structuring of 
biological space, in the tradition that spans from Goethe to Cuvier, 
and from D’Arcy Thomson to Thom and Gould and Lewontin. In 
this tradition, the permanence of forms or structures from one 
generation to another “is interpreted in relation to the pure game of 
three-dimensional space within which the constructive parameters of 
the organism are established.”11 In this sense the distinction, 
originating from physics,12
                                                 
11 Barbara Continenza, and Elena Gagliasso, Giochi aperti in biologia, Franco 
Angeli, Milano, p. 67. 
 between laws of coexistence and laws of 
12 The principle of locality might induce one to think that physical laws of 
succession are more important than physical laws of coexistence, so that the 
latter somehow reduce to, or supervene on, the former. However, quantum 
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succession would correspond in biology to the distinction between 
diachronic “laws of evolution” and “structural laws”, the former 
related to time, and the latter constraining the structure of the spatial 
relationships between coexisting biological phenomena and entities.  
From this perspective, the recent use of powerful computers has 
made us discover structural biological laws: 
 
“Cardiovascular systems, respiratory systems, plant vascular 
systems, and insect tracheal tubes all exhibit the same continuously 
branching structure that increases or decreases in scale as a quarter 
power of body size.13
 
 (my emphasis) 
This wide-scope biological regularity seems sufficient to allow us 
to respond positively to question 1): there are indeed biological laws 
of coexistence and they play a very important and generalized role. 
The following question is whether they are reducible to physical 
laws. 
2) The law of the quarter power mentioned in the quotation above 
                                                                                                                
non-separability and entanglement, even in the absence of action at a distance 
as in Bohm's interpretation, has rehabilitated the importance of laws of 
coexistence at a fundamental level. 
13 J. Brown, G. West, B. Enquist, Nature, CCLXXXIV, 1999, pp. 1607-1609. The 
work cited is taken from the website 
http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Bulletins/bulletin-
summer97/feature.html. A later study published in Nature excluded plants from 
this generalization. 
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is related to Kleiber’s law, which connects the metabolic rate R, (i.e. 
the quantity of energy consumed in one second), to the dimensions 
of the animal, according to a precise ratio of proportionality, 
expressed by the cube of the fourth root of the organism’s body mass 
M 
                       R = (M)3/4                                          1) 
For example, an animal c weighing one hundred times  another 
animal m – Mc = 100 Mm – would have a metabolic rate that is only 
more ore less thirty times greater.14
It could be argued that in virtue of the criterion above, 1) it counts 
as a physical law, because it only contains physical parameters (“the 
quantity of energy consumed in a second”, “mass”). On the other 
hand, “metabolism” is typically applied in biological contexts, and 
“organism’s mass” is after all a physical property of a biological 
entity. Laws of this kind are sort of mixed between physics and 
biology, and it should be no surprise that in many cases it is indeed 
difficult to conclude that a given nomic statement belongs to physics 
or biology. Consider “bridge” disciplines biophysics or biochemistry 
 This law is quite universal, as it 
holds from mitochondria, unicellular organisms to the largest 
animals (see figure 1), so that it definitely holds counterfactuals: if a 
were an animal, it would be related to its metabolism by the above 
relation.  
                                                 
14 Brown and Enquist, work cited. Note that Mc = (100)3/4 equals approximately 
31 Mm. 
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or molecular biology: any law in these fields cannot but “overlap” 
between the two disciplines. The existence of such an overlap, 
however, is good news for the defenders of biological laws, unless 
their enemies give them ground and retreat to the more limited claim 
that it is in purely biological domains that laws don’t exist. Since 
this claim will be discussed in what follows, I can move on with my 
argument. 
 
 
 
                   
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
 
Fig.1 
(taken from http://universe-review.ca/R10-35-metabolic.htm) 
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Interestingly, various hypotheses to explain this universal principle 
have been put forth since 1932. Lately, Kleiber's law has been 
derived, or explained, by a more profound law of coexistence, 
namely that the same ramified model – which refurnishes a 
vegetable or animal organism’s vital fluids (lymph or blood) – fills 
the living organism’s space like a fractal.15
The omnipresence of forms branching out like a “tree,” and 
repeating themselves in different scales like fractals, can be 
explained by the fact that these structures optimize the transport of 
energy in all living species; as West, one of the authors of this theory 
expresses, “when it comes to energy transport systems, everything is 
a tree.”
 In a word, this type of 
ramified structure, which is essential to transport material to and 
from the cells, would be capable of explaining the existence of the 
otherwise mysterious proportionality between dimensions and the 
metabolic rate. 
16
While the key concepts entering Kleiber's law are somewhat 
  
                                                 
15 Other geometrical considerations, involving the fixed percentage of the 
volume of the body that is occupied by the vessels, explain the presence of the 
cube in the formula above. The fractal law contributes only the the quarter 
power component. For more explanatory details, see http://universe-
review.ca/R10-35-metabolic.htm. 
16  Ibid. 
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mixed, the quotation above mentions “cardiovascular systems, 
respiratory systems, plant vascular systems, and insect tracheal 
tubes, all exhibiting the same continuously branching structure”. We 
have seen that since all these notions are biological, the criterion for 
identifying a law as biological allows us to conclude that the fact 
that “all these structures have a tree-like shape” is a biological law. It 
could be noticed that it is implausible that a physical or “mixed”, 
biophysicallaw like Kleiber's can be explained by a purely 
biological, structural law, exemplified by biological entities carrying 
life-sustaining fluids or, more in general, by entities that optimize 
energy transport. This could create evidence in favor of the view that 
also the fractal law is really a physical law. However, there is no 
violation of the causal closure of the physical world in this case, 
since it is the shape of the fractal that carries the explanatory role, 
and shape in a sense is an abstract, geometrical notion, and in 
another sense, when we consider it exemplified, is a spatial, 
topological property of biological entities. As such, the fractal law is 
a biological law. 
The question of the relationship between such structural 
biological laws and evolutionary principles (or laws of succession, 
in my vocabulary) naturally poses itself at this point. I cannot enter 
this complex debate here, if not to note that there is a sense in which 
biological evolution is constrained by laws of coexistence of the 
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kind we discussed above. On the other hand, however, against recent 
attempts at downplaying the role of natural selection,17 it should be 
admitted that selection would obviously choose the organisms 
whose “forms” render more efficient the transport of those bodily 
fluids that are necessary for sustaining the life of the whole 
organism. In a word, if we could identify biological laws of 
succession with the family of models generated by the Principle of 
Natural Selection,18
In this respect, the tradition of the study of laws of the forms, if 
helped by the development of new mathematical models of the 
relevant phenomena, could help us to look at the sterile debate 
between selectionists and defenders of laws of the form in a whole 
new way. This claim will be illustrated in the next section, which 
will also provide evidence for the fact, too neglected by 
philosophers, that the development of a future “mathematics of 
living beings” will contribute much to both biology and 
 biological laws of coexistence and biological 
laws of succession could and should coexist peacefully, at least if we 
want to succeed in explaining the fact of evolution. 
                                                 
17 J. Fodor, M. Piattelli Palmarini, What Darwin got wrong, New York, Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2010. 
18 For the view that the Principle of Natural Selection is really an abstract scheme 
to form more concrete models (like F=ma), see Mauro Dorato, The Software of 
the Universe. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. For the view that the Principle of 
Natural Selection is to be understood within the semantic view of theories, see 
Marcel Weber, “Life in a physical world”, in F. Stadler, D. Dieks, W. Gonzales, 
S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (Eds), The Present Situation in the 
Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010, pp.155-168. 
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mathematics. 
 
 
 
3. Some examples of mathematical models in biology 
 
The currently burgeoning field of mathematical biology can be 
regarded as providing crucial reasons to believe in the existence of 
biological laws. The argument for this claim is based on the 
following four premises, which presuppose a distinction between 
scientific laws (a defining feature of the model we use to represent 
the world) and what they purport to describe, namely lawmakers that 
I refer to as natural laws.  
1. Scientific laws in physics are mainly dressed in 
mathematical language, a fact that is not an accidental feature, but 
rather an indispensable component of physics; 
2. Mathematically formulated scientific laws in physics are part 
of the definition of the mathematical models of those natural 
phenomena (natural laws) that we intend to represent via the model 
itself; 
3. The amazing effectiveness of mathematical models in 
predicting and explaining physical phenomena19
                                                 
19 The claim that mathematics can be used also to explain physical phenomena is 
 can only be 
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accounted for if there are natural laws in the physical world, laws 
that the models mentioned in 2. refer to or partially represent; 
4. The three premises above apply also to biology, and 
guarantee the existence of biological laws rather than accidental 
generalizations if they do so in physics.  
I take it that premise 1. is uncontroversial: since the modern 
times, it would be hard to do any physics without the abstract 
models of natural phenomena provided by mathematics. Premise 2. 
can also be granted: take for instance ma= -kx, which is Hooke's 
law; clearly, this statement also defines the main features of the 
corresponding abstract model, in the sense that anything that 
satisfies that law can be represented by the model of the harmonic 
oscillator.20 Premise 3. is based on the claim that the existence of 
mathematical models that enable us to predict and explain physical 
phenomena suffices for the existence of physical laws. This premise 
is of course as controversial as is any realist claim based on 
inferences to the best explanation. Here I don't need to defend this 
premise explicitly, and actually I can take it for granted.21
                                                                                                                
defended in M. Dorato and L. Felline, “Structural explanation and scientific 
structuralism”, in A. Bokulich and P. Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, 
Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, Springer, 2011, pp.161-176. 
 Note that 
3. is sometimes  accepted for the existence of physical regularities, 
20 Giere, Ronald (1988), Explaining Science, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press. 
21 For a defence of this argument, see S. Psillos, How Science tracks Truth. 
London: Routledge. 
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and that here I could be content only with the conditional claim that 
if the inference works for physical laws then, in virtue of the analogy 
between physical and biological models of phenomena on which 4. 
is based, it also works for biological laws. A case study taken from a 
recent study of the collective behavior of starlings will, I hope, 
suffice to argue in favor of the analogy stated in 4. 
 
4.1 Flocks of starlings and their scale invariant and 
topologically-dependent interactions 
 
Under the attack of a predator or even independently of it, flocks 
of starlings (sturnus vulgaris) can assume highly symmetrical and 
rapidly changing geometrical forms. These birds can synchronize 
their flight in such a way that one is led to think of the flock as a 
single, super-individual organism, whose parts always remain 
together in a strikingly coordinated fashion. 
In the years 2006-8, the Italian group of statistical physicists and 
biologists led by Giorgio Parisi has taken thousands of pictures of 
these birds (which some years ago had invaded parts of Rome with 
imaginable consequences...) in order to provide a precise empirical 
basis to study their collective behavior in three dimensions.22
                                                 
22 M. Ballerini, N. Cabibbo, R. Candelier, et al (2008). “An empirical study of 
large, naturally occurring starling flocks: a benchmark in collective animal 
behaviour”, 
 The 
Animal Behaviour, Volume 76, Issue 1, pp. 201-215. 
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guiding idea of the research program was that this empirical study, if 
suitably modeled, could be generalized to school of fishes, herd of 
mammals, flight of insects, etc. The scope and universality across 
the animal kingdom of these dynamical laws, if they could be found, 
would have been quite impressive. 
The collective, cooperative behavior of the starlings is 
particularly important from an evolutionary point of view. Stragglers 
have a significantly larger probability of being attacked, while if the 
group remains together, each individual bird ends up being much 
safer. 
The main question raised by this amazing collective behavior is, 
of course, how individual birds can remain in the group even when 
the latter, under attack by a predator changes significantly its form 
and density.23
On the basis of models based on spin glasses and computerized 
 The biological qualitative laws that had been advanced 
so far presumed that the interaction among individuals decreased 
with the metric distance between any two birds, as in Newton's law 
of gravitation. However, this hypothesis would not explain the fact 
that even after density changes that are typical of starlings flight, the 
group continues to exist as such.  
                                                 
23 M. Ballerini, N. Cabibbo, R. Candelier, A. Cavagna, E. Cisbani, I. Giardina, V. 
Lecomte, A. Orlandi, G. Parisi, A. Procaccini, M. Viale, and V. Zdravkovic 
(2008) ‘Interaction ruling animal collective behavior depends on topological 
rather than metric distance: Evidence from a field study’, Proc. Nation. Acad. 
Science, USA, 105, pp. 1232-1237. 
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vision, Parisi's group has advanced the new hypothesis that the birds' 
interaction depends not on metric distance (how many meters they 
are apart from each other) but on their topological distance, which is 
measured by the number of birds separating each bird from the 
others with which it interacts. This implies, for instance, that two 
birds separated by ten meters and two birds that are one meter apart 
“attract” each other with the same “strength”, independently of 
distance, since the number of intermediate birds in the two cases is 
the same.24
 
 This topological dependency – which I regard as a 
biological law, possibly interspecific and not just holding for sturnus 
vulgaris – allows cohesion to the flock even when the density 
changes. This hypothesis was tested with some simulations: 
“Thanks to novel stereometric and computer vision techniques, we 
measured 3D individual birds positions in compact flocks of up to 
2600 starlings... whenever the inter-individual distance became 
larger than the metric range, interaction would vanish, cohesion 
would be lost, and stragglers would ‘evaporate’ from the 
aggregation. A topological interaction, on the opposite, is very 
robust, since its strength is the same at different densities”.(ibid.) 
 
So the first species-specific law that we can express in this 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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context, a law that can be expressed in a qualitative and quantitative 
way, is that the interaction between starlings does not depend on 
metric distance but on topological distance. According to our above 
specified criterion, this regularity is certainly purely biological. Does 
it hold counterfactuals, so that, in virtue of the other criterion 
mentioned above, it counts as a law? Relatedly, can we generalize 
this law to other highly social species? 
In order to answer these question, it is appropriate to mention the 
fact that the mapping of the flight of the individual birds has shown 
an interesting anisotropy, which could be linked to the nervous 
system of the birds; this anisotropy means that it is more probable to 
find the neighboring birds on the side rather than in the direction of 
flight, and this holds up to six-seven individuals, since there is no 
interaction with the 10th nearest individual. Charlotte Hemelrijk, a 
theoretical biologist at Groningen, had found the same sort of 
anisotropy in school of fishes.25
The resilience of the flock against losing individual birds is a 
metaphor for the resilience of the following regularity: starlings 
keep track of topological distance by keeping track of 6/7 
individuals against possible disturbing factors due to the presence of 
predators. I would add that the regularity in question is capable of 
holding counterfactual conditionals: “if a were a starling within a 
 
                                                 
25 Toni Feder, “Statistical physics is for the bird”, Physics today, 60, 28, p. 29. 
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flock, it would adjust to changes of densities by keeping track of its 
6/7 neighbors”. Amazingly enough, the direct interaction with such a 
limited number of individuals is sufficient to spread correlation 
among a group that can be formed by thousands of birds!  
In order to formulate another species-specific law that can 
generalize to other species, let me define the correlation length as 
the spatial length or spread of the behavioral correlation existing in a 
group, and the interaction range as the number of animals with 
which each animal is directly interacting: the former concept can be 
global, the latter is always local. An effective way to illustrate the 
difference between these two notions is using the example made by 
the authors of the research on the scale-free correlation of starlings 
flocks,26
 
 namely the “telephone game” played by n people. Suppose 
that each person in a group of n whispers a message to her neighbor 
and so on, and that there is no corruption of the message (no noise): 
“The direct interaction range in this case is equal to one, while the 
correlation length, i.e. the number of individuals the phrase can 
travel before being corrupted, can be significantly larger than one, 
depending on how clearly the information is transmitted at each 
                                                 
26 A. Cavagna, Alessio Cimarelli, Irene Giardina, Giorgio Parisi, Raffaele 
Santagati, Fabio Stefanini, and Massimiliano Viale, “Scale free correlation in 
starlings flocks, Proce National Academy of Science, 107 (26), Jun 29, 2010, 
pp. 11865–11870, available also on line at 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1005766107, p.1.  
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step.”27
 
 
In the hypothesis of no noise, the whole group of n person is 
correlated (so that the correlation length in this example is n); of 
course, in more realistic examples, the information is always 
transmitted with some noise. We could note in passing that the 
possibility of sending the same (email) message to n people at once 
(interaction range = n) makes the correlation length grow 
exponentially in a very rapid time. 
Cavagna et al. note furthermore that there are various ways to 
achieve order or correlation among social animals like starlings. One 
would be via a coordination of all birds' behavior with that of a 
single leader or of a few leaders; such a top-down method, however, 
would not be very efficient for the survival of birds. For example, if 
the leader did not notice the presence of a predator or of any other 
danger, the rigid rule of following the leader would not be of very 
much help, even if all birds, unlikely, had cognitive access to the 
remote position of the leader (flock can be made by numerous 
individuals). Furthermore, in this way any fluctuation in the 
behavior of one bird would not be correlated to the behavior of 
another, unless the bird in question is the leader.28
A much more efficient way to get really cooperative and adaptive 
  
                                                 
27 Ibid., p.2. 
28 Andrea Cavagna, et al. “Scale-free...”, quoted. 
         
21 
behavior is to avoid a centralized global order, but create a global 
correlation between all animals, a correlation that can be originally 
caused just by any one individual, the one, say, who notes the 
presence of a predator. If the change in direction of flight of this 
individual can rapidly influence all the flock via a few direct 
interactions between the single animals that is transferred to whole 
group, then the survival chances of each single animal will be 
enhanced, because no bird will be isolated. No part of the group can 
be separated from the rest, and the flock behaves like a critical 
system, capable of responding in a maximal way to a perturbation 
occurring to a single individual. With the words of our authors: 
 
“For example, in bacteria the correlation length was found to be 
much smaller than the size of the swarm. In this case parts of the 
group that are separated by a distance larger than the correlation 
length are by definition independent from each other and therefore 
react independently to environmental perturbations. Hence, the finite 
scale of the correlation necessarily limits the collective response of 
the group. However, in some cases the correlation length may be as 
large as the entire group, no matter the group’s size. When this 
happens we are in presence of scale-free correlations”.29
 
 
                                                 
29 Andrea Cavagna et. al., work cited, p. 1 
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The degree of global ordering in a flock is measured by the so-
called polarization Φ, 
Φ=
1
N ∑
vi
∣vi∣
 
 
where vi is the velocity of bird i and N is the total number of birds 
within the flock (ibid.). Note that the fact that the polarization Φ is 
very close to 1 (birds fly parallel to each other) may be also 
considered to be an empirical, quantitative law, since also this 
statement holds counterfactuals.30
 
 Polarization is in fact a measure of 
the correlation of the animal's behavior, in the sense that when the 
correlation is, as in the case of starlings, close to 1, it is interpretable 
as the fact that the velocities of the birds are parallel, while when it 
is 0 “it means uncorrelated behavior, that is, non-parallel velocities. 
  5. Conclusion 
 
The idea that in biology there are no laws (or event quantitative 
laws) seems to be simply due to a lack of imagination on our part, 
and to the fact that mathematical biology has not penetrated enough 
                                                 
30 “Polarization is... a standard measure of global order in the study of collective 
animal behavior”, since when the value is close to 1 it corresponds to parallel 
velocities, while when it is 0 is mean uncorrelated velocities”, “Scale free, 
quoted, ibid. 
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the community of philosophers of biology. So I conclude by quoting 
from an excellent, recent introduction to mathematical biology, 
which here I want to advertise, thereby signalling two interesting 
areas of research in mathematical biology, namely, population 
biology and ecology on the one hand, and philogenetics and graph 
theory on the other.31
Population biology and echologyThe problems in population 
genetics and echology are similar to those illustrated in the case of 
the collective behavior of starlings, since they relate interaction 
between single members and collective, global properties. Imagine 
that a tree in an equally spaced orchard has a disease that, in analogy 
to the case of starlings, can be transmitted only to the nearest 
neighbors with a probability p. The problem is to calculate the 
probability that the correlation becomes scale-free, so that every tree 
in the forest becomes infected. Let E(p) be the expected probability 
in question: 
 
 
“Intuitively, if p is small, E(p) should be small, and if p is large, E(p) 
should be close to 100%. In fact, one can prove that E(p) changes 
very rapidly from being small to being large as p passes through a 
small transition region around a particular critical probability pc. 
                                                 
31 Michael Reed, “Mathematical Biology”, in Timothy Gowers, June Barrow-
Green and Imre Leader (eds.), The Princeton Companion to Mathematics, 
Princeton University Press, pp. 837-848. 
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One would expect p to decrease as the distance, d, between trees 
increases; farmers should choose d in such a way that p is less than 
the critical probability, in order to make E(p) small. We see here a 
typical issue in ecological problems: how does behavior on the large 
scale (tree epidemic or not) depend on behavior at the small scale 
(the distance between trees).”32
 
  
In this example scale-free correlations (epidemics among trees) 
depend on the existence of critical probabilities; it should be obvious 
how in this case, as in the previous one, the possibility of gathering 
empirical data allow us to make precise predictions about, say, the 
existence of scale-free correlations among individuals in a group 
(flocks, schools, trees in a forest, etc.).  
 
 Philogenetics and graph theory 
 
A connected graph with no cycles is called a tree. The tree has a 
vertex ρ, or root, and its vertices that have only one attached edge 
are called leaves. The problem consists in determining the trees that 
are consistent with our empirical and theoretical information about 
evolution (ibid.). Such phylogenetics rooted trees are used to select a 
particular empirical characteristic, say the number of teeth, and then 
                                                 
32 Reed, quoted, p. 845. 
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define a function f from the leaves X, the set of current species, to 
the set of nonnegative integers. For a given leaf x (a species in X), 
one then let f(x) be the number of teeth of members of x. 
 
“It is characters such as these that are measured by biologists. In 
order to say something about evolutionary history, one would like to 
extend the definition of f from X to the larger set V of all the vertices 
in a phylogenetic tree. To do this, one specifies some rules for how 
characters can change as species evolve. A character is called convex 
if ... between any two species x and y with character value c there 
should be a path back in evolutionary history from x and forward 
again to y such that all the species in between have the same value 
c....A collection of characters is called compatible if there exists a 
phylogenetic tree on which they are all convex. Determining when 
this is the case and finding an algorithm for constructing such a tree 
(or a minimal such tree) is called the perfect phylogeny 
problem.”(ibid, Reed, p. 846). 
 
The reader will excuse these long quotations. They have the 
purpose to allow me to conclude that it is by paying more attention 
to questions like these that a more thorough understanding of the 
relation physics and biology (and their nomic features) can be 
gained, a relation that is going to be deeper and deeper the more 
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mathematics is becoming the common language of both. It seems 
fair to say that biology is becoming more and more, despite what is 
usually believed, a Galilean science, based as physics is “on sensible 
experiences and necessary demonstrations”.33
                                                 
33    See S. Drake, Essay on Galileo and the History and Philosophy of Science, 
vol. III, selected and introduced by N. Swerdlow and T.Levere, University of 
Toronto Press, p. 84. 
 
